Abstract In this paper we use the minimax inequalities obtained by S. Park (2011) to prove the existence of weighted Nash equilibria and Pareto Nash equilibria of a multiobjective game defined on abstract convex spaces.
INTRODUCTION
Recently, in [8] , S. Park introduced a new concept of abstract convex space and several classes of correspondences having the KKM property. With this new concept, the KKM type correspondences were used to obtain coincidence theorems, fixed point theorems and minimax inequalities. S. Park generalizes and unifies most of important results in the KKM theory on G-convex spaces, H-spaces, and convex spaces (for example, see [8] - [13] ).
For the history of KKM literature, we must remind Ky Fan [3] , who extended the original KKM theorem to arbitrarily topological vector space. The property of close-valuedness of related KKM correspondences was replaced with more general concepts. In [7] , Luc and al. have introduced the concept of intersectionally closed-valued correspondences and in [13] , S. Park has obtained new KKM type theorems for this kind of KKM correspondences.
In this paper we use the minimax inequalities obtained by S. Park in [13] to prove the existence of weighted Nash equilibria and Pareto Nash Equilibria of a multiobjective game defined on abstract convex spaces. For the history of minimax theorems, I also must remind the name of Ky Fan (see [4] ). Among the authors who studied the existence of Pareto equilibria in game theory with vector payoffs, I emphasize S. Chebbi [2] , W. K. Kim [5] , W. K. Kim, X. P. Ding [6] , H. Yu [16] , J. Yu, G. X.-Z Yuan [17] , X. Z. Yuan, E. Tarafdar [18] . A reference work is the paper of M. Zeleny [19] . The approaches of above-mentioned authors deal with the Ky Fan minimax inequality, quasi-equilibrium theorems or quasi-variational inequalities. We must mention the papers of P. Borm, F. Megen, S. Tijs [1] , who introduced the concept of perfectness for multicriteria games and M. Voorneveld, S. Grahn, M. Dufwenberg [14] , who studied the existence of ideal equilibria. Ather authors, as H. Yu (see [16] ), obtained the existence of a solution of multiobjective games by using new concepts of continuity and convexity.
The paper is organised as follows: In section 2, some notation, terminological convention, basic definitions and results about abstract convex spaces and minimax inequalities are given. Section 3 introduces the model, that is, a multiobjective game defined on an abstract convex space and the concept of weight Nash equilibrium. Section 4 contains existence results for weight Nash equilibrium and Pareto Nash equilibrium.
ABSTRACT CONVEX SPACES AND MINIMAX INEQUALITIES
Let A be a subset of a topological space X. 2
A denotes the family of all subsets of A. A denotes the closure of A in X and intA denotes the interiorof A. If A is a subset of a vector space, coA denotes the convex hull of A. If
is defined by F − (y) = {x ∈ X : y ∈ F (x)} for y ∈ Y. Let F (A) be the set of all nonempty finite subsets of a set A.
For the reader's convenience, we review a few basic definitions and results from abstract convex spaces.
Definition 1 [13] . Let X be a topological space, D be a nonempty set and let Γ : F (D) → 2 X be a correspondence with nonempty values Γ A = Γ (A) for A ∈ F (D). The family (X, D; Γ ) is called an abstract convex space. Definition 2 [13] . For a nonempty subset
Definition 4 [13] .
We have abstract convex subspaces as the following simple observation.
Proposition 1 For an abstract convex space (X, D, Γ ) and a nonempty subset
The following result is known.
Lemma 1 (12) Let (X i , D i , Γ i ) i∈I be any family of abstract convex spaces. Let X = i∈I X i be equipped with the product topology and
is an abstract convex space.
Definition 6 [13] . Let (X, D, Γ ) be an abstract convex space. Then F :
Definition 7 [13] . The partial KKM principle for an abstract convex space (X, D, Γ ) is the statement that, for any closed-valued KKM correspondence F : D → 2 X , the family {F (z)} z∈D has the finite intersection property. The KKM principle is the statement that the same property also holds for any open-valued KKM correspondence.
An abstract convex space is called a KKM space if it satisfies the KKM principle.
Proposition 2 Let (X, D, Γ ) be an abstract convex space and (X,
Let (X, D, Γ ) be an abstract convex space. Definition 8 [13] . The function f : X → R is said to be quasiconcave (resp. quasiconvex) if {x ∈ X : f (x) > r} (resp., {x ∈ X : f (x) < r} is Γ -convex for each r ∈ R.
In [7] , Luc and al. have introduced the concept of intersectionally closedvalued correspondences.
Luc at al. [7] noted that (ii)⇒(i).
Proposition 3 (7)
The correspondence F is intersectionally closed-valued (resp. transfer closed-valued) if only if its complement F
C is unionly openvalued (resp. transfer open-valued).
Definition 10 [13] . LetY be a subset of X. (i) Y is said to be intersectionally closed (resp. transfer closed ) if there is an intersectionally (resp., transfer) closed-valued correspondence
(ii) Y is said to be unionly open (resp. transfer open) if there is an unionly (resp., transfer) open-valued correspondence
S. Park gives in [13] the concept of generally lower (resp. upper) semicontinuous function.
Definition 11 [13] . The function f : D × X → R is said to be generally lower (resp. upper) semicontinuous (g.l.s.c.) (resp. g.u.s.c.) on X whenever, for each z ∈ D, {y ∈ X : f (z, y) ≤ r} (resp., {y ∈ X : f (z, y) ≥ r}) is intersectionally closed for each r ∈ R.
The aim of this paper is to prove the existence of a weighted Nash equilibrium for a multicriteria game defined in the framework of abstract convex spaces. For our purpose, we need the following theorem (variant of Theorem 6.3 in [13] ).
Theorem 1 (Minimax inequality, [13] ). Let (X, D = X, Γ ) an abstract convex space satisfying the partial KKM principle, f, g : X × X → R extended real-valued functions and γ ∈ R such that (i) for each x ∈ X, g(x, x) ≤ γ; (ii) for each y ∈ X, F (y) = {x ∈ X : f (x, y) ≤ γ} is intersectionally closed (respectiv, transfer closed); (iii) for each x ∈ X, co Γ {y ∈ X : f (x, y) > γ} ⊂ {y ∈ X : g(x, y) > γ}; (iv) the correspondence F : X → 2 X satisfies the following condition: there exists a nonempty compact subset K of X such that either (a) K ⊃ ∩{F (y) :
Then 1) there exists a x 0 ∈ X (resp.,
2) if γ := sup x∈X g(x, x), then we have
For the case when X = D (we are concerned with compact abstract spaces (X, Γ ) satisfying the partial KKM principle), we have the following variants of the corollaries stated in [13] .
Corollary 1 (13) Let f, g : X × X → R be real-valued functions and γ ∈ R such that (i) for each x, y ∈ X, f (x, y) ≤ g(x, y) and g(x, x) ≤ γ; (ii) for each y ∈ X, {x ∈ X : f (x, y) > γ} is unionly open in X; (iii) for each x ∈ X, {y ∈ X : g(x, y) > γ} is Γ -convex on X; Then 1) there exists a x 0 ∈ X such that f (x 0 , y) ≤ γ for all y ∈ X; 2) if γ := sup x∈X g(x, x), then we have inf x∈X sup y∈X f (x, y) ≤ sup x∈X g(x, x).
Corollary 2 (13) Let f, g : X × X → R be functions such that (i) for each x, y ∈ X, f (x, y) ≤ g(x, y) and g(x, x) ≤ γ;
(ii) for each y ∈ X, f (·, y) is g.l.s.c on X; (iii) for each x ∈ X, f (x, ·) is quasiconcave on X; Then we have inf x∈X sup y∈X f (x, y) ≤ sup x∈X g(x, x).
MULTIOBJECTIVE GAMES
Now we consider the multicriteria game (or multiobjective game) in its strategic form. Let I be a finite set of players and for each i ∈ I, let X i be the set of strategies such that X = i∈I X i and (X i , D i , Γ i for each i ∈ I) is an abstract convex space with
, where k i ∈ N, which is called the payoff function (or called multicriteria). From Lemma 1, we also have that (X, D, Γ ) is an abstract convex space, where X = i∈I X i , D = i∈I D i and Γ (A) = i∈I Γ i (π i (A)) for each A ∈ F (D).
Definition 12. The family
If an action x := (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ) is played, each player i is trying to find his/her payoff function
, which consists of noncommensurable outcomes. We assume that each player is trying to minimize his/her own payoff according with his/her preferences.
In order to introduce the equilibrium concepts of a multicriteria game, we need several necessary notation.
Notation. We shall denote by R Notation. For each i ∈ I, denote X −i := j∈I\{i} X j . If x = (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ) ∈ X, we denote x −i = (x 1 , ..., x i−1 , x i+1 , ..., x n ) ∈ X −i . If x i ∈ X i and x −i ∈ X −i , we shall use the notation (
Notation. For each u, v ∈ R m , u · v denote the standard Euclidian inner product.
Let x = ( x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ) ∈ X. Now we have the following definitions.
Definition 13.
A strategy x i ∈ X i of player i is said to be a Pareto efficient strategy (resp., a weak Pareto efficient strategy) with respect to x ∈ X of the multiobjective game
Remark 1 Each Pareto equilibrium is a weak Pareto equilibrium, but the converse is not always true.
Definition 14.
A strategy x ∈ X is said to be a Pareto equilibrium (resp., a weak Pareto equilibrium) of the multiobjective game G = ((X i , D i , Γ i ), T i ) i∈I if for each player i ∈ I, x i ∈ X i is a Pareto efficient strategy (resp., a weak Pareto efficient strategy) with respect to x.
Definition 15.
A strategy x ∈ X is said to be a weighted Nash equilibrium with respect to the weighted vector W = (W i ) i∈I with
Remark 2 In particular, if W i ∈ R ki + with ki j=1 W i,j = 1 for each i ∈ I, then the strategy x ∈ X is said to be a normalized weighted Nash equilibrium with respect to W.
EXISTENCE OF WEIGHTED NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND PARETO NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Now, as an application of Theorem 1, we have the following existence theorem of weighted Nash equilibria for multiobjective games.
Theorem 2 Let I be a finite set of indices, let (X i , D i = X i , Γ i ) i∈I be any finite family of abstract convex spaces such that the product space (X, Γ ) satisfies the partial KKM principle. If there is a weighted vector W = (W 1 , W 2 , ..., W n ) with W i ∈ R ki + \{0} such that the followings are satisfied:
(ii) there exists g : X × X → R extended real-valued function such that for each x ∈ X, g(x, x) ≤ 0 and for each x ∈ X, co Γ {y ∈ X :
X satisfies the following condition: there exists a nonempty compact subset K of X such that either (a) K ⊃ ∩{F (y) :
then there exists x ∈ K such that x is a weighted Nash equilibria of the game G = ((X i , Γ i ), T i ) i∈I with respect to W.
Proof. Define the function f :
, (x, y) ∈ X × X. By Theorem 1, we have that inf x∈X sup y∈X f (x, y) ≤ sup x∈X g(x, x) = 0. It follows that there exists an x ∈ K such that f ( x, y) ≤ 0 for any y ∈ X. That is
For any given i ∈ I and any given y i ∈ X i , let y = ( x −i , y i ). Then we have
for each i ∈ I and y i ∈ X i , that is x ∈ K is a weighted Nash equilibrium of the game G with respect to W.
We obtain the following corollaries for the compact games when X = D.
Corollary 3 Let I be a finite set of indices, let (X i , Γ i ) i∈I be any finite family of abstract convex spaces such that the product space (X, Γ ) satisfies the partial KKM principle. If there is a weighted vector W = (W 1 , W 2 , ..., W n ) with W i ∈ R ki + \{0} such that the followings are satisfied:
(iii) for each x ∈ X, {y ∈ X : g(x, y) > 0} is Γ -convex on X; then there exists x ∈ X such that x is a weighted Nash equilibria of the game G = ((X i , Γ i ), T i ) i∈I with respect to W.
Corollary 4 Let I be a finite set of indices, let (X i , Γ i ) i∈I be any finite family of abstract convex spaces such that the product space (X, Γ ) satisfies the partial KKM principle. If there is a weighted vector W = (W 1 , W 2 , ..., W n ) with W i ∈ R ki + \{0} such that the followings are satisfied:
) is quasiconcave on X; then there exists x ∈ X such that x is a weighted Nash equilibria of the game G = ((X i , Γ i ), T i ) i∈I with respect to W.
In order to prove an existence theorem of Pareto equilibria for multiobjective games, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (15) Each normalized weighted Nash equilibrium x ∈ X with a weight W = (W 1 , W 2 , ..., W n ) with W i ∈ R ki + \{0} (resp., W i ∈intR ki + \{0}) and ki j=1 W i,j = 1 for each i ∈ I, for a multiobjective game G = (X i , T i ) i∈I is a weak Pareto equilibrium (resp. a Pareto equilibrium) of the game G.
Remark 3 The conclusion of Lemma2 still holds if x ∈ X is a weighted Nash equilibrium with a weight W = (W 1 , W 2 , ..., W n ), W i ∈ R ki + \{0} for i ∈ I(resp., W i ∈intR ki + \{0} for i ∈ I) of the game G.
Remark 4 A Pareto equilibrium of G is not necessarily a weighted Nash equilibrium of the game G.
Theorem 3 Let I be a finite set of indices, let (X i , D i = X i , Γ i ) i∈I be any finite family of abstract convex spaces such that the product space (X, Γ ) satisfies the partial KKM principle. If there is a weighted vector W = (W 1 , W 2 , ..., W n ) with W i ∈ R ki + \{0} such that the followings are satisfied:
(i) for each y ∈ X, F (y) = {x ∈ X : n i=1 W i ·(T i (x −i , x i )−T i (x −i , y i )) ≤ 0} is intersectionally closed (respectiv, transfer closed);
, y i )) > 0} ⊂ {y ∈ X : g(x, y) > 0}; (iii) the correspondence F : X → 2 X satisfies the following condition: there exists a nonempty compact subset K of X such that either (a) K ⊃ ∩{F (y) : y ∈ M } for some M ∈ F ( X); or (b) for each N ∈ F ( X), there exists a compact Γ -convex subset L N of X relative to some X ′ ⊂ X such that N ⊂ X ′ and K ⊃ L N ∩ ∩ y∈x ′ F (y) = φ; then there exists x ∈ K such that x is a weak Pareto equilibrium of the game G = ((X i , D i = X i , Γ i ), T i ) i∈I . In addition, if W = (W 1 , W 2 , ..., W n ) with W i ∈int R ki + \{0} for i ∈ I, then G has at least a Pareto equilibrium point x ∈ X.
Proof. By Theorem 2, G has at least weighted Nash equilibrium point x ∈ K with respect of the weighted vector W. Lemma 2 and Remark 3 shows that x is also a weak Pareto equilibrium point of G, and a Pareto equilibrium point of G if W = (W 1 , W 2 , ..., W n ) with W i ∈intR ki + \{0} for each i ∈ I.
